If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

Sunday, July 26, 2009

Hybrids right and left

Two fabulous stories in the news of late: first, that Senator Brownback (R-KS) has introduced a bill to ban "part-human, part-animal creatures, which are created in laboratories, and blur the line between species." (I linked to the Huffington Post blippet because it links to the other relevant data). Second, the recent concern about military robots running amok feasting on the flesh of the living. (Levi brought this first to my attention, but I soon heard about it on NPR's "Wait wait don't tell me" as well--which last week made reference to Sen. Brownback's 'Mermaid bill' as well).

Now, like most people my gut reactions are that robots driven to consume flesh are bad, and that bills banning human-animal hybrids are silly. But on both of these issues there points to be made contrary to one's political intuition. The EATR robot awakens Terminator scenario nightmares, but on the other hand it is "green" in its energy source. Sure, it feeds on organic matter, but where do you think petroleum comes from?

As for the latter issue, it does not seem far-fetched to me--much less far-fetched, in fact, than the apocalyptic EATR scenario--that biotech corporations would invent human-animal hybrids that exist only for profit (both monetary and knowledge-power) and that have no legal existence or protection. Donna Haraway brought some attention to this in her essay on the oncomouse (the mouse designed to grow cancer). The purpose of the oncomouse is to model human bodily conditions through the body of a nonhuman. It would be much more effective for R&D to just have a version of the human body that is nonhuman.

At the same time, there is the more theoretically serious issue that Brownback is reifying "human" and "animal" as an actual opposition and denying the dignity (and pervasiveness) of hybridity. In either case, laughing at Brownback for trying to ban centaurs and mermaids is stupid and politically ignorant. Laughing at Brownback is probably not a bad idea, generally speaking, but that does not take him out of the senate.

4 comments:

  1. I actually heard about both of these thanks to google news alerts, originally. I never thought the rest of the blogosphere would be so interested!

    Regardless, I am with you. EATR doesn't particularly scare me. And I think the issues surrounding the hybrid bill are more complex than progressives are willing to admit. Good post!

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  2. The conjunction of "rise of the machines" and "green energy" proves the "liberal fascist" thesis.

    Bush made reference to banning manimals in a state of the union address, presumably as a reason to outlaw stem cell research. As far as I can tell, Locke (for one) seemed to believe that monstrous hybrids was how novelty was introduced into the natural world. He talks at length about jumarts (bull/mule crossbreeds), human-pigs (along with an interesting discussion of the proportion of human to pig that would lead to moral consideration) and rat-cat hybrids (many still thought that cats were the natural enemies of rats in the seventeenth century).

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  3. Craig, that's really interesting stuff on the history of hum/animal hybrids. Did Locke then think that monstrous hybrids mellowed out into non-monstrous specie, or do we just get used to being surrounded by monstrous hybrids?

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  4. His theory of species is nominal meaning that species are not real things of the world. (He leaves open the issue as to whether angels might have access to real essences.) He also wants to maintain that species is not form (e.g., things can look like other things without actually being that thing: fool's gold vs. real gold) nor is species reproduction (e.g., just because the thing had a cat for a mother and a father does not mean that the thing is a cat). Hence, what monsters show is a failure of language: we don't have an adequate "general name" or "abstract idea" for the thing, so we are forced to call it a monster. His point is that species essence (even though nominal) is not applicable at the level of the individual - something is not born of that species - but that thing becomes a member of that species if it meets the definition of the species (hence the importance of the "general name" or "abstract idea"). Failing to recognize monsters as a failure of language rather than a failure of the world (e.g., as an omen or miracle) leads people to say and think stupid things. This is why he maintains throughout the Second Treatise that a criminal is not a human. The best description he can come up for a criminal is a noxious animal comparable to lions, tigers and wolves.

    I assume that the pig-manimal, should more pig-manimals come into existence, would require the adoption of a new "general name" or "abstract idea." Apparently jumarts and unicorns are potential examples of this: there is a general name, but no empirical cases.

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